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As a singular witness and actor of the tumultuous twentieth century, Ernst 
Jünger remains a controversial and enigmatic figure known above all for 
his vivid autobiographical accounts of experience in the trenches of the 
First World War. This article will argue that throughout his entire oeuvre, 
from personal diaries to novels and essays, he never ceased to grapple 
with what he viewed as the central question of the age, namely that of the 
problem of nihilism and the means to overcome it. Inherited from 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of Western civilization in the late nineteenth 
century to which he added an acute observation of the particular role of 
technology within it, Jünger would employ this lens to make sense of the 
seemingly absurd industrial slaughter of modern war and herald the 
advent of a new voluntarist and bellicist order that was to imminently 
sweep away timorous and decadent bourgeois societies obsessed with 
security and self-preservation. Jünger would ultimately see his 
expectations dashed, including by the forms of rule that National 
Socialism would take, and eventually retreated into a reclusive quietism. 
Yet he never abandoned his central problematique of nihilism, developing 
it further in exchanges with Martin Heidegger after the Second World 
War. And for all the ways in which he may have erred, his life-long 
struggle with meaning in the age of technique and its implications for war 
and security continues to make Jünger a valuable interlocutor of the 
present. 
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Almost everything that most strongly moved us ... we owed to the 
lonely Nietzsche.
1
  
 
 
Penned on the occasion of the Festschrift for Martin Heidegger’s sixtieth birthday in 
1950, Ernst Jünger’s Über die Linie (“Over the Line”) opens with a citation from the 
preface of Nietzsche’s The Will to Power in which the philosopher proclaims himself 
to be “the first perfect nihilist of Europe” who has “lived through the whole of 
nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself.”2 Jünger proceeds to endorse 
Nietzsche’s assertion that it is only through the full completion of nihilism – nihilism 
in its active form, in other words – that its own overcoming will be realized, laying 
the ground for a new flourishing of life.
3
 The essay’s willfully optimistic prognosis is 
that, after two world wars and under the dark shadow of a possible global nuclear 
conflagration (the Soviet Union had tested its first atomic weapon the previous year), 
we are collectively on the cusp of that very liminal point of passage, that we are about 
to “cross the line” and experience the “new turning of being” that will follow from it.4 
Beyond its passive expression as the exhaustion of a life no longer capable of 
believing or willing anything, nihilism thus holds within itself “the presence of a great 
destiny, an originary power, the influence of which none can escape.”5 
 
Five years later, Heidegger would respond on Jünger’s own sixtieth birthday with a 
text of his own entitled Über “die Linie”, a play on the original title to indicate that he 
was writing about “the line” rather than beyond it.6 Heidegger argues therein against 
Jünger’s broadly sanguine outlook, the latter conceding much later that his post-war 
optimism had been premature: “after the defeat, I was essentially saying: the head of 
the snake has already crossed the line of nihilism, it has exited from it, and the entire 
body will soon follow, and we will soon enter a much better spiritual climate... In fact, 
we are still far from it.” 7  The crux of Heidegger’s critique is directed at the 
Nietzschean perspective that Jünger had made his own, indicting the will to power as 
a continuation and even culmination of the Western metaphysical tradition that had 
led to the impasse of nihilism and from which it could not therefore provide a way out. 
He does however credit Jünger with being the most faithful interpreter of Nietzsche, 
observing in an earlier text that “in order to see (to think) the will to power as reality 
of the real, Nietzsche has to be the one who questions. In the region that Nietzsche 
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opened up, Jünger is a describer who subordinates himself to the answer of that 
questioner.”8 
 
Irrespective of what we make of Heidegger’s appraisal, it is indubitably the case that 
Jünger’s oeuvre, starting with the earliest war diaries, is infused with the problem of 
nihilism as set out by Nietzsche and the task of both determining and participating in 
the conditions of its overcoming. Throughout his long life of 102 years, he would 
accordingly never deviate from the essence of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to 
power as he understood it. He would however impress two important personal 
inflections to this Nietzscheanism, the first essentially attributable to the different 
historical times in which he lived and the second best understood by reference to 
philosophical temperament. 
 
If Nietzsche was a man of the nineteenth century, Jünger was undoubtedly one of the 
twentieth and markedly attuned to the spirit of the age at that, including where it most 
gravely erred. Above all, he was attentive to the significance of developments that 
were still inchoate in Nietzsche’s own time and accordingly feature only peripherally 
in his writings. These were, in Heidegger’s words, “the phenomena related to 
technology, in that they constitute the fundamental manner in which reality organizes 
itself and affirms itself as will to power.”9 Indeed, for Jünger the questions of nihilism 
and technology were intimately bound, particularly as they related to the cataclysmic 
wars that shook Europe in his lifetime. 
 
The second characteristic of Jünger’s Nietzscheanism is his overtly metaphysical 
conception of the will to power. Rather than simply the guide to living for an 
aristocratic few it is often read as, he would interpret it as an elemental force piercing 
through the veil of human reality all the more insistently as nihilism entered its final 
stages. As Ibáñez-Noé puts it, “if indeed this description of the spirit of the age is 
based on Nietzsche’s doctrine of the will to power, then this doctrine can no longer be 
understood as the private ideology of some individuals and must, instead, be 
conceived as the metaphysical law of the age.”10 
 
Within this broader continuity and coherence in Jünger’s thinking, it is possible to 
distinguish three main stages in its development from his time in the trenches of the 
First World War until his reflections and exchanges with Martin Heidegger in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. In the first period in which he published his war 
diaries and wrote extensively on his Fronterlebnis (“front experience”), he would 
assert that the war had been the expression of an elemental will to power that 
nineteenth century bourgeois society had futilely repressed. If the mechanization of 
war had begotten an industrial slaughterhouse that threatened to render senseless the 
grounds for which it had been set in motion, technology remained an instrument in the 
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hands of men that came out of the conflict ennobled to the extent that they were able 
to affirm the experience in all its naked brutality and suffering. From the second half 
of the 1920s onwards, Jünger endeavored to derive from his earlier writings a vision 
of the impending future, one in which the timorous bourgeois liberal societies of the 
nineteenth century would be swept away by a new technological age of total societal 
mobilization and armed conflict. Seemingly anticipating the totalitarian regimes that 
were germinating at the time, he imagined a reconciliation of technique with a new 
humanity under the tutelary figure of the Worker that would realize the completion of 
nihilism and founding of new values which Nietzsche had prophesized. Finally, the 
experience of National Socialism that he had always refused to endorse and an even 
more cataclysmic world war saw Jünger abandon his bellicism but still strive to see in 
the latest catastrophe the augury of nihilism’s curtain call. While he would eventually 
revise the timing of his prediction, he would continue to express a general optimism 
in its advent, retreating for the remainder of his life into a quietist position far from 
the hustle and bustle of politics he previously had been so close to.  
 
Although the present article is primarily concerned with charting this development in 
Jünger’s thinking in the light of his committed Nietzscheanism, its interest does not 
reside merely in a contribution to intellectual history. Predominantly known in the 
English-speaking world for his personal account of the Great War, Jünger’s wider 
writings also merit engagement from the standpoint of our present circumstances. If 
Jünger remains relevant to us, it is evidently not for his objectionable political views 
and demonstrably false predictions, although the reasoning behind his errors remains 
instructive in itself. Rather it is for those aspects of his appreciation of the 
characteristics of his time that continue to be salient for our own age, even where 
these have taken historical trajectories counter to his original expectations. 
Appropriately contextualized, Jünger’s writings retain pertinence for an insight into 
contemporary societies that seemingly extend ever further and deeper the ambit of 
technicized processes of production and rationalization, all the while espousing 
individual security and comfort as their highest values and the sole sources of 
legitimation for the unleashing of violence rendered to its purest instrumental 
expression. While we may justifiably demur from his political and existential 
recommendations, recoil at his aestheticization of war, and baulk at his metaphysical, 
if not mystical, inclinations, to the extent that we still find the question of nihilism a 
consequential one we find in Jünger a valuable interlocutor. The task of 
reconstructing Jünger’s thought taking precedence, the explicit treatment of these 
considerations can only be limited here and a return to them will have to await the 
concluding discussion, until when it will be left to the individual reader to judge of the 
contemporary import of his writings. Before we turn to Jünger however, an essential 
preliminary is to be found in a succinct examination of Nietzsche’s own scarce yet 
instructive thoughts on technology, as they provide an indispensable key to the figure 
that Heidegger considered “the only genuine continuer of Nietzsche.”11 
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The Machine as Teacher: Nietzsche on Technology 
 
 
Premises of the machine age - The press, the machine, the railway, 
the telegraph are premises whose thousand-year conclusion no one 
has yet dared to draw.
12
 
 
 
While Jünger’s reading of Nietzsche is certainly particular and not in any sense 
exhaustive or definitive, it is nonetheless a broadly coherent one that is grounded in 
the original texts he was undoubtedly well versed in. His is not one of the 
opportunistic bastardized interpretations that flourished in the half-century after 
Nietzsche’s death, although he was heavily influenced by the problematic posthumous 
work The Will to Power. If the present article will necessarily assume from the reader 
some familiarity with Nietzsche’s writings, it is nonetheless profitable to briefly 
examine those that concern technology and its relation to nihilism since this theme 
comes to occupy a central place in Jünger’s work. Nietzsche’s thoughts on technology 
may well be few and far between but those that we can identify are revealing and 
provide a precious insight into the underpinnings of Jünger’s own outlook.  
 
Nietzsche’s appreciation of technology, where it can be found, is generally negative. 
The “machine” “abases” the worker through “an anonymous and impersonal 
slavery”13, it “releases a vast quantity of energy in general that would otherwise lie 
dormant [but] provides no instigation to enhancement, to improvement, to becoming 
an artist”14, and the extent to which society is modeled upon it is the sign of “a weak 
age.”15 Employing an imagery that Jünger repeatedly draws upon, Nietzsche evokes 
the risk of men being reduced to mere fuel for their increasingly self-serving 
machines: 
 
Mankind mercilessly employs every individual as material for heating its great machines: 
but what then is the purpose of the machines if all individuals (that is to say mankind) are 
of no other use than as material for maintaining them? Machines that are an end in 
themselves - is that the umana commedia?
16
 
 
In these views, Nietzsche appears to share much in common with the wider current of 
post-romantic cultural pessimism prevalent in his time and its general concern over 
the noxious effects of modern industrial life. Yet in a more ambiguous passage that 
must have caught Jünger’s eye, the machine is also designated as a teacher that is 
educating us in the ways of modern politics and warfare, if still to be reproached for 
its instrumentalization of life:  
 
The machine as teacher - The machine of itself teaches the mutual cooperation of hordes 
of men in operations where each man has to do only one thing: it provides the model for 
the party apparatus and the conduct of warfare. On the other hand, it does not teach 
individual autocracy: it makes of many one machine and of every individual an 
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instrument to one end. Its most generalized effect is to teach the utility of 
centralization.
17
  
 
Nietzsche’s scattered thoughts on technology need to be related to his broader and 
more systematic critique of utilitarian thinking with which they evidently dove-tail. 
Indeed, within his account of life as will to power – “wherever I found the living, 
there I found the will to power”18 – active forces of creation and affirmation that usher 
in the new are counter-posed to reactive forces of self-preservation and negation that 
only ratify the existing. The machine seems to fall squarely on the side of the latter 
since these forces, in Gilles Deleuze’s words, “exercise [their force] by securing 
mechanical means and final ends, by fulfilling the conditions of life and the functions 
and tasks of conservation, adaptation and utility.”19 
 
It would therefore seem that the rampant condition of nihilism as the devaluation of 
all values and inability to posit any goals towards which life should tend that 
Nietzsche saw in the late nineteenth century denotes the absolute triumph of reactive 
forces. And yet Nietzsche insisted upon a drawing a crucial distinction between 
passive and active forms of nihilism, the latter expressing not an exhaustion of the 
“spirit’s power” but rather that its strength is such that it has outgrown the values and 
goals that originally supported it and which now must be destroyed so as to clear the 
way for new ones. Nihilism is thereby diagnosed as a “pathological intermediate 
state”, an ambiguous liminal condition that brings with it the possibility of its own 
overcoming and the foundation of a new order of values.
20
  
 
Perhaps the most interesting discussion in this regard is found in a fragment from The 
Will to Power in which Nietzsche appears to see the total reduction of humanity to 
mere mechanism as the pre-condition for the production of new species of being that 
can forge new values and meaning. It is thus at the very highest point of the 
instrumentalization of man and devaluation of all values that the reversal of that 
movement can be initiated, that one is able to break through to the other side of 
nihilism: 
 
To show that an ever more economical use of men and mankind, a ‘machinery’ of 
interests and actions ever more firmly intertwined, necessarily implies a counter-
movement … 
Once we have that imminent, inevitable total economic administration of the earth, 
mankind will be able to find its best meaning as a piece of machinery in the 
administration’s service: as a tremendous clockwork of ever smaller, ever more finely 
‘adapted’ cogs; as an ever-increasing superfluity of all the dominating and commanding 
elements; as a whole of tremendous force, whose individual factors represent minimal 
forces, minimal values. Against this miniaturization and adaptation of men to more 
specialized usefulness, a reverse movement is required – the generation of the 
synthesizing, the summating, the justifying man whose existence depends on that 
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mechanization of mankind, as a substructure upon which he can invent for himself his 
higher way of being ...  
Just as much, he needs the antagonism of the masses, of the ‘leveled-out’, the feeling of 
distance in relation to them; he stands upon them, lives off them. This higher form of 
aristocratism is that of the future. – In moral terms, this total machinery, the solidarity of 
all the cogs, represents a maximum point in the exploitation of man: but it presupposes a 
kind of men for whose sake the exploitation has meaning.
21
  
 
For Marcel Gauchet, Nietzsche is envisaging here the establishment of “domination 
without any utilitarian role, thereby rendered to its essential function” and 
transcending the nihilistic crisis of meaning.
22
 This all points to the profound 
ambivalence characterizing nihilism, and by extension the machine, in Nietzsche’s 
thought. While on the one hand it degrades life, deprives it of any higher meaning and 
reduces it to a function of utility, on the other hand its fullest realization is the ground 
from which a new vitality can spring. This conception is sustained throughout 
Jünger’s own work, serving as the consistent lens through which he strove to make 
sense of the traumatic experience of the First World War and the social upheaval that 
followed. 
 
 
Lieutenant Jünger’s Fronterlebnis 
 
 
The pace of the charge disperses to the wind all the values of the 
world like so many autumn leaves.
 23
   
 
 
Nietzsche may have prophesized “wars such as the earth has never seen” but he could 
scarcely have imagined the full extent of the destructive forces that were to be 
unleashed in the First World War.
24
 Ernst Jünger, however, is one individual who 
plunged headlong into the cauldron of war and still emerged determined, in the face 
of the most terrible slaughter, to be faithful to Nietzsche’s exhortation to affirm life. 
He drew from it insights that he would develop throughout the following decades 
regarding the central role of technology to modern society and the full might of the 
revolutionary effects it was still to impress on the shattered European order. 
 
After the end of the war, Jünger would produce a string of publications based upon his 
war diaries, narrating and reflecting upon his experience of the conflict in which he 
served as a highly decorated shock troop commander on the Western front.  War as 
Inner Experience (1922), Copse 125 (1925), and Fire and Blood (1925) and above all 
Storm of Steel (1920) would bring to their author fame and recognition throughout 
Weimar Germany as a prominent literary voice of the “front generation.” Combining 
a characteristic nonchalance with a genuine talent for evocative prose, Jünger penned 
accounts that did not shy away from the conflict’s savagery and dreadful human toll 
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but simultaneously sought to transcend them in presenting the war as an intense 
existential and aesthetic experience. While the problem of nihilism does not feature in 
explicit terms in any of these writings, the influence of Nietzsche is already evident 
amidst the celebration of the human warring spirit on the infernal stage of the 
mechanized battlefield. 
 
Confronted with the industrial slaughter unleashed by the First World War, Jünger 
perceived as acutely as any of its participants that traditional chivalric and heroic 
conceptions of the warrior could not be sustained in the muddy fields of Northern 
France. The military machines pitted against each other by the opposing sides 
mercilessly consumed the human matériel that was fed to them, reducing men to “a 
kind of charcoal, which is hurled under the glowing cauldron of war so as to keep the 
work going.”25 With direct reference to Storm of Steel, Hannah Arendt would write 
that the “worshippers of war were the first to concede that war in the era of machines 
could not possibly breed virtues like chivalry, courage, honor, and manliness, that it 
imposed on men nothing but the experience of bare destruction together with the 
humiliation of being only small cogs in the majestic wheel of slaughter.”26 While 
Jünger himself undoubtedly displayed great bravery for which he would receive the 
Pour le Mérite, the highest German military honor available, his war diaries are 
replete with reflections on the innumerable contingencies that could mean the 
difference between life and death with scant regard to courage or skill. Face-to-face 
confrontations with the enemy, the traditional stage for feats of martial valor, were 
also rare in a war dominated by long-range weaponry.
27
 
 
The duration and intensity of the conflict, the increasing mobilization of all the 
resources of the societies involved, and the general subjugation of all social life to its 
pursuit meant that the war appeared to acquire an autonomous and self-perpetuating 
life of its own, over and above the goals and values it purported to serve. In those 
circumstances, the “death of God” took on very concrete manifestations – Jünger 
narrates how church towers were “unceremoniously” blown up by German engineers 
to hinder the orientation of enemy artillery, the landmarks of the sacred casually 
obliterated to serve the immediate instrumental needs of the war machine.
28
 
 
And yet while Jünger readily acknowledged that the industrialization and 
mechanization of warfare threatened to dwarf man and render combat meaningless, he 
sought in his immediate post-war writings nonetheless to continue asserting the 
warrior’s centrality and enduring ability to imbue conflict with purpose: 
 
The battle of the machines is so colossal that man almost completely disappears before it. 
Often already, caught in the force fields of the modern battlefield, it seemed to me 
strange and scarcely believable that I was witnessing world-historical events. Combat 
took on the form of a gigantic, lifeless mechanism and swept an icy, impersonal wave 
across the ground. It was like the cratered landscape of a dead star, lifeless and radiating 
heat. And yet: behind all this is man. Only he gives the machines their direction and 
meaning. It is he that spits from their mouths bullets, explosives and poison. He that 
elevates himself in them like birds of prey above the enemy. He that sits in their stomach 
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as they stalk the battlefield spewing fire. It is he, the most dangerous, bloodthirsty, and 
purposeful being that the Earth has to carry.
29
 
 
If technology had undeniably transformed the practice of war, for Jünger the conflict 
had in fact merely revealed elemental forces and ancestral bellicose drives that 
modern civilization and its religion of progress had falsely held to be expurgated. 
Jünger did not thereby attempt to justify the massacre by reference to any specific 
values or national interests. Indeed, his war accounts eschew any discussion of the 
rationales for the conflict, even expressing a certain detachment when speaking of 
“the flags and symbols for which most, and for a long time, held but an incredulous 
smile” upon the entry of the “community of Europe” into the First World War.30  
 
War and sacrifice were to be their own justification, regardless of the merits of the 
values in the name of which they were being pursued. Repudiating any hatred of the 
enemy combatant, he saw in the fraternity of warriors born of the war the future of 
Europe and reserved his harshest words for those of his compatriots who failed to live 
up to the exalted demands of the time.
31
 The worth of the combatants was not to be 
found in those ideas in the name of which they were fighting – indeed these were 
secondary if not suspect – but in the willingness to sacrifice oneself for them: 
 
Perhaps … we are sacrificing ourselves for something inessential. But no one can rob us 
of our value. Essential is not what we are fighting for, but how we fight. Onward toward 
the goal, until we triumph or are left behind. The warriors’ spirit, the exposure of oneself 
to risk, even for the tiniest idea, weighs more heavily in the scale than all the brooding 
about good and evil.
32
 
 
Yes, the soldier, in his relation to death, in the sacrifice of his being for an idea, knows 
little of the philosophers and their values. But in him, in his actions, life finds a more 
poignant and profound expression than it can in any book. And again, out of all the 
absurdity and insanity of external events, a shining truth prevails: death for a conviction 
is the highest accomplishment. It is proclamation, deed, fulfillment, faith, love, hope and 
goal; it is, in this imperfect world, a perfect thing, absolute perfection. In this the cause is 
nothing and the conviction everything. One can die stubbornly for an indubitable error: 
that is the greatest thing there is.
33
 
 
Jünger appears to be echoing here Nietzsche’s famous affirmation that it is not “the 
good cause that hallows even war” but “the good war that hallows any cause” made in 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra
34
, a book that was widely distributed to German soldiers 
during the war.
35
 Or still further the passage from The Will To Power that speaks of 
“the pessimism of active energy: the question ‘for what?’ after a terrible struggle, 
even victory” and the importance of having “a goal for which one does not hesitate to 
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offer human sacrifices, to risk every danger, to take upon oneself what is bad and 
worst: the great passion.”36  
 
Above all, Jünger was determined to stay true to Nietzsche’s injunction to affirm life 
and the manifestations of the will to power, however seemingly insufferable they 
might be. Over and above courage and martial skill, it was the ability to endure and 
transcend the horror of the battlefield that was to be the mark of the warrior. The 
language employed here is unmistakably Nietzschean: 
 
Whom in this war experienced only negation, only suffering proper, and not affirmation, 
the superior movement, lived it as a slave. He will have had no inner experience of it, 
only an external one. Here it passes by before us, life itself, the great tension, the will to 
struggle and power in the forms of our time, in our own form, in the most defiant and 
resolute attitude imaginable. Against this powerful and incessant flow towards combat, 
all works are void, all concepts are hollow, one experiences the expression of the 
elemental, the colossal energy that always was and will be, even when humans and their 
wars have long disappeared.
37
 
 
Jünger would repeatedly return to the idea that the war had made manifest “the 
elemental”, the fundamental vital force of becoming that he interpreted through the 
lens of a metaphysical reading of the will to power. In the times ahead, the task facing 
humanity would be to live up to this transcendental experience of the war or risk 
being crushed by the weight of its apparent nihilism. 
 
In this regard, nothing appeared more urgent to Jünger than to address the question of 
technology, given the central role it had occupied in the war and the senselessness it 
had seemed to bring to it. This particular problematique of the relation of humanity to 
its machines, forged in the crucible of the Great War, would be carried through his 
entire oeuvre, eliciting a range of the responses as he continued to wrestle with it. In 
an interview with Der Spiegel in 1982, Jünger thus underlined that “in the First World 
War I still believed that man was stronger than the material. But in the meantime it 
has become clear that the technicians have won and destroyed the old orders … The 
soldier is no longer the soldier of the old estate society and has nothing to do with 
heroism, since Mars no longer stands behind the warrior.” 38 Jünger does not tell us 
exactly when he made this realization but the war writings certainly exhibit an 
oscillation between these two positions. On occasion he professed to have witnessed 
the consecration of technology and the subjugation of its creator: “the domination of 
the machine over man, of the servant over the master, becomes evident … here is 
revealed the style of a materialist generation and technique celebrates its bloody 
triumph.”39 Elsewhere, as we have seen, he strove to affirm the continued primacy of 
man as the guiding will that gave machines their purpose and meaning.  
 
Ultimately he strove for a resolution of this tension, writing of his generation that it 
was the first “to reconcile itself with the machine and to see in it not only the useful 
but the beautiful as well.”40 “Yes, the machine is beautiful”, he continues: 
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its beauty is self-evident to anyone who loves life in all its fullness and power. Nietzsche 
might well have been writing of the machine (though it did not yet have a place in his 
Renaissance landscape) when he argued that life was more than Darwin’s wretched 
struggle for existence, but a will to higher and deeper goals. The machine must be made 
more than a means of production to satisfy our pitiful basic needs; it should provide us 
with a higher and deeper satisfaction.
41
 
 
The answer thus lay for Jünger in a fusion of man and machine into a totality through 
the uninhibited mobilization of all energies, above all that of will. “We have to 
transfer what lies inside us onto the machine. That includes the distance and ice-cold 
mind that transforms the moving lightning-stroke of blood into a conscious and 
logical performance. What would these iron weapons that were directed against the 
universe be if our nerves had not been intertwined with them and if our blood didn't 
flow around every axle.”42 Jünger would soon see in such a symbiosis the promise of 
a new world that could live up to the elemental forces unearthed by the war. However 
the emblematic figure that would ultimately appear to him as best suited to preside 
over such a world would not be the warrior, perhaps still too tributary to its 
aristocratic origins in the age of the masses, but rather the industrial worker. 
 
 
The Herrschaftsgebilde of the Worker in the Age of Total Mobilization 
 
 
There is no way out, neither sideways nor backwards; it is instead 
necessary to intensify the force and speed of the processes in which 
we are caught up. It is good, then, to sense that hidden beneath the 
dynamic excesses of the time is an immobile center.
43
 
 
 
It is in the writings of the early 1930s, chiefly The Worker (1932) but also Total 
Mobilization (1930) and On Pain (1934), that we find Jünger’s most systematic 
attempt to articulate the synthesis that could reconcile humanity with technology and 
give sense to the social upheaval of his times as the birth pangs of a world beyond 
nihilism. Heidegger held The Worker in particular esteem, as he would repeatedly 
indicate to Jünger in their post-war exchanges, and dedicated to it an entire semester 
of teaching in 1939-40 at the University of Freiburg. In his eyes, it provided “a 
description of European nihilism in the phase which succeeded the First World War” 
and constituted a work which itself “belongs to the phase of active nihilism.”44 By 
Heidegger’s own admission, Jünger’s writings were a major source of influence on 
his later reflections on technology although he would, for his part, explicitly distance 
himself from Nietzschean conceptions of the will to power and adopt a more 
pessimistic stance.  
 
Jünger would long hesitate over authorizing the post-war republication of The Worker 
(Der Arbeiter). It was only in 1964 and with the express encouragement of Heidegger 
that it was made once more available in print as part of the first edition of Jünger’s 
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completed works and appeared free of any of the revisions that he usually saw fit to 
make to re-editions of his writings. The reasons for Jünger’s reluctance and ultimately 
unrealized concerns that it would reignite past controversies around him are self-
evident when the content and original timing of the book are considered. The 
polemics directed against the bourgeois liberal order, the unrestrained embrace of war, 
and the heralding of total societal mobilization under the aegis of an all-encompassing 
state that are found in The Worker obviously take on a particularly portentous 
signification, appearing as they do just as National Socialism acceded to power. Yet if 
Jünger can be legitimately tasked with contributing to the intellectual climate in which 
fascist ideology took shape,
45
 he was never seduced by Nazism itself. 
  
Jünger certainly was a major figure in the conservative revolutionary movement of the 
1920s and contributed extensively to the virulently nationalist and anti-Weimar 
publications of that feverish period. There is also no doubt that he generally 
welcomed the rise of the National Socialists at that time, particularly for their fierce 
opposition to the terms of the Versailles Treaty. And yet he persistently kept his 
distance from the Nazi party, systematically turning down numerous attempts to court 
him that included an invitation to serve as party deputy in the Reichstag in 1927. After 
1933, he would refuse any of the honors offered to him, retreating from Berlin to the 
German provinces and ceasing all political writing, all the while his war memoirs 
continued to enjoy a wide readership due in part to their active promotion by the new 
regime. In 1939, Jünger would publish an allegorical tale entitled On the Marble 
Cliffs that was widely perceived to be a veiled critique of Hitler and the Nazi state on 
the eve of the Second World War.
46
 Whether it was due to some uncanny prescience 
of the catastrophe that would follow or more probably to an aristocratic detachment 
and distaste for the base vulgarities of Nazism, Jünger never did compromise himself 
in the manner of either Martin Heidegger or his friend Carl Schmitt. He was 
nonetheless viewed as highly suspect in the aftermath of the Second World War for 
his past nationalist writings and, having refused to submit to denazification, was 
banned from publishing in Germany until 1949. While somewhat rehabilitated in the 
following years, he remained a divisive figure in his homeland until the end of his 
long life with controversy periodically erupting as it most notably did when he was 
awarded the Goethe Prize in 1982. 
 
Leaving aside the charged question of the degree of responsibility to be personally 
ascribed to Jünger for the German political turn of the 1930s that was to prove so 
heavy with consequences, it is clearly in the writings he produced at this time that the 
determining role within his thought of the Nietzschean problem of nihilism and its 
overcoming comes most clearly in focus. Jünger believed the era of social 
galvanization inaugurated by the Great War was rapidly coming to a head, bringing us 
ever closer in contact with the elemental. Did the visible preparation of states for war, 
the increasing mobilization of societies and the apparent willingness of the individual 
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to embrace sacrifice not suggest that “we are witnessing the opening act of the 
spectacle to come, in which life appears as the will to power, and nothing else?”47  
 
Published in 1930, the short piece entitled Total Mobilization laid the ground for the 
lengthier considerations found in The Worker, bridging Jünger’s war writings with the 
broader societal account he developed there. We find therein a formulation of the 
fundamental principle of the age manifest in the Great War and the period of upheaval 
that followed it, namely the increasing mobilization of all available energies and the 
concomitant sundering of society from its traditional moorings. Thus “the process by 
which the growing conversion of life into energy, the increasingly fleeting content of 
all binding ties in deference to mobility, gives an ever-more radical character to the 
act of mobilization.” 48  This escalation towards total mobilization ultimately 
“expresses the secret and inexorable claim to which our life in the age of masses and 
machines subjects us ... each individual life becomes, ever more unambiguously, the 
life of a worker … following the wars of knights, kings, and citizens, we now have 
wars of workers.”49 In sum: 
 
the image of war as armed combat merges into the more extended image of a gigantic 
work process. In addition to the armies that meet on the battlefields, originate the modern 
armies of commerce and transport, foodstuffs, the manufacture of armaments – the army 
of work in general. In the final phase, which was already hinted at toward the end of the 
last war, there is no longer any movement whatsoever – be it that of the homeworker at 
her sewing machine – without at least indirect use for the battlefield. In this unlimited 
marshaling of potential energies, which transforms the warring industrial countries into 
volcanic forges, we perhaps find the most striking sign of the dawn of the age of work.
50
 
 
So if it was through the ordeal of the Great War that the truth of the age had been 
revealed, the new world that was being ushered in was not to be the dominion of the 
soldier but that of the worker. It is to the ascendancy of this figure and its world-
historical significance that Jünger would turn his full attention in The Worker since, in 
the twentieth century, “one possesses power insofar as one represents the figure 
[Gestalt] of the Worker and thereby gains access to the corresponding dimension of 
totality.”51 
 
It is important to grasp what Jünger understood with the notion of Gestalt as it 
occupies a central place in the work’s conceptual apparatus. Vincent Blok shows how 
Gestalt is not to be understood here in the Platonic terms of an idea occupying a 
transcendental realm that is imperfectly instantiated in the real world of becoming but 
rather in the Nietzschean conception of Gestalt as “the product of the will to power of 
life”, a staging post in the process of expansion and preservation of power. Blok also 
refers in passing to Jünger’s understanding of Gestalt as “a Herrschaftsgebilde amidst 
the world of becoming.”52 Nietzsche had indeed argued for discarding the nascent 
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sociological study of human collectivities in favor of an account of 
Herrschaftsgebilde, formations of ‘domination’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘rule’ or ‘mastery’ 
according to different translations.
53
 With explicit reference to these formations, 
Nietzsche spoke of “ruling centers”, “complex structures that have relatively lasting 
life within becoming” and for which “the viewpoint of ‘value’ is the viewpoint of 
[their] conditions of preservation and enhancement.”54 It is therefore tempting to see 
no coincidence in the chosen subtitle of Der Arbeiter as “Herrschaft und Gestalt” 
with the latter term a synonym of Gebilde in the sense of ‘shape’ or ‘form.’ Jünger 
effectively understood his work as providing an account of the contemporaneous 
emergence of a new Herrschaftsgebilde whose new values still remained inchoate: 
“we find ourselves in a last and indeed quite remarkable phase of nihilism, 
characterized by the broad expansion of new social orders with corresponding values 
yet to be seen.”55  
 
The worker referred to by Jünger is demonstrably not the proletarian figure of 
socialist discourse which, presumably not without a sense of irony, he dismisses as a 
mere emanation of bourgeois conceptions.
56
 The Gestalt of the worker is rather that 
which embodies the wider mobilization of energies which can be observed in both 
capitalist and socialist societies (in regard of which Soviet economic planning 
constitutes a preeminent manifestation). Economistic analyses are consequently 
unable to get to the heart of the upheavals of the modern world: “the fulcrum of 
uprising is neither economic freedom nor economic power but power in general.”57 
Jünger is also at pains to distance himself from the racialist theories prevalent at the 
time, insisting that “within the landscape of work race has nothing to do with 
biological conceptions of race” and that “the Gestalt of the Worker mobilizes the 
entire human stock [Bestand] without discrimination.”58  
 
The Gestalt of the Worker is however everywhere counterposed to the figure of the 
bourgeois as an enfeebled nihilistic existence concerned merely with creature 
comforts and petty self-interest. Thus “the bourgeois person is perhaps best 
characterized as one who places security among the highest of values and conducts 
his life accordingly.”59 This particular obsession with security is for Jünger nothing 
else than the instantiation of a transhistorical metaphysical drive for self-preservation 
against the forces of creative change: “the bourgeois’s efforts to hermetically seal his 
living space against the intrusion of the elemental is the most successful expression of 
an immemorial striving for security, the trace of which can be followed everywhere, 
in natural history and the history of the spirit as in any individual life.”60   
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Jünger is particularly critical of what he sees as the efforts of liberal societies to ward 
away pain and discomfort: “progress combines the economic conquest of the globe, 
which magnetically draws in the most distant lands, with ridding the world of all 
prejudices that cause pain.”61 All of which appears to echo Nietzsche’s description of 
passive nihilism as a condition in which “everything which revives, heals, soothes, 
benumbs comes to the fore in a variety of disguises: religious, or moral or political or 
aesthetic, etc.” 62 , his association of “sensitivity to pain” with the decadence of 
Western civilization
63, or still Zarathustra’s foretelling of the advent of the “Last 
Man” who “invented happiness” and chose comfort and security over the possibility 
of overcoming oneself.
64
 In contrast to the “heroic and cultic world” that confronts 
and masters pain through an objectification of the body in the service of a higher 
calling, modern sensitivity for Jünger “corresponds to a world in which the body is 
itself the highest value”, relating “to pain as the power to be avoided at all cost, 
because here pain confronts the body not as an outpost but as the main force and 
essential core of life.”65 
 
This timorousness makes the bourgeois unable to foster nobler forms of life and as 
such only capable of utilitarian and defensive, but ultimately self-defeating, uses of 
war for the purpose of safeguarding this impoverished existence:  
 
[The bourgeois] also rejects the highest justification for war, the offensive, because he 
senses that he does not measure up to it, and where, be it in the most evident self-interest, 
he calls on the soldier for his assistance or disguises himself as a soldier, he will never 
renounce the invocation of self-defense, or indeed if possible of the defense of humanity. 
The bourgeois knows only defensive war, that is to say he doesn’t know war at all, if 
only because he is by essence excluded from all warring elements. He is unable, however, 
to prevent their eruption in the midst of his order, as all the evaluation of values he could 
oppose to them are of an inferior rank.
66
  
 
Jünger sees here the confirmation of Zarathustra’s teachings: “The prophecy of the 
Last Man has found rapid fulfillment. It is accurate – except for the assertion that the 
Last Man lives longest. His age already lies behind us.”67 Indeed, one can already 
glimpse the world beyond nihilism on the horizon since “the age of security has been 
superseded with surprising speed by another, in which the values of technology 
prevail.”68  
 
The bourgeois was the figure that oversaw the rise in the nineteenth century of the 
forms of domination that correspond to his rule, the terminal decline of the previous 
aristocratic and dynastic order measured by the extent to which the latter’s remaining 
bastions kowtowed to bourgeois ideas of constitutionalism, contractualism, and 
individual liberty. The trial of arms was then as now the final arbitrator since the 
superior sources of military power unlocked by conscription had as pre-requisite the 
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realization of bourgeois liberty and emancipation from absolutist rule.
69
 But at present 
technology and its concomitant modes of social mobilization were inexorably 
ushering in the age of the Worker by imposing their own conceptions and necessities 
on the bourgeois order of life:  
 
Wherever man comes into the orbit of technique, he is confronted with an unavoidable 
either-or. It is for him to either accept its peculiar means and to speak its language or to 
perish. But if one accepts them – and this is very important – one makes oneself not only 
the subject of technical processes, but also simultaneously their object.
70
  
 
In other words, one can only master technique insofar as one becomes attuned to its 
demands, reinventing humanity accordingly. Jünger concludes from this that as 
bourgeois societies submit themselves to the imperatives of technological 
development, they are being increasingly brought willy-nilly into the ambit of the 
Worker’s Gestalt:  
 
In technology we recognize the most effective and incontestable means of total 
revolution. We know that the sphere of destruction possesses a secret center from which 
the seemingly chaotic process of the subjugation of the old forces accomplishes itself. 
This act is manifest in that the subjugated, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, accept 
the new language. We observe that a new humanity is moving to this crucial center stage. 
The phase of destruction will be replaced by a real and visible order, if that race which 
understands the new language as elementary language, and not in the sense of mere 
intellect, progress, utility and convenience, achieves dominion [Herrschaft]. This will 
come to be to the extent to which the face of the Worker reveals its heroic features.
71
 
 
We are reminded here of Nietzsche’s account of the will to power as the 
encroachment, domination and appropriation of the existing by new forces that only 
belatedly reveal their true character. “The will to power can only express itself against 
resistances; it seeks what will resist it”, Nietzsche thus tells us, “assimilation and 
incorporation is, above all, a willing to overwhelm, a training, shaping and reshaping, 
until at last the overwhelmed has passed entirely into the power of the attacker and 
augmented it.”72  
 
This growth of a new power is an inherently disruptive process as it must first lay to 
waste the old order, tearing it down its idols and hollowing out its values, before it can 
fully supplant it. “The ‘triumph of technique’ leaves behind it a wide trail of 
destroyed symbols. Its inexorable result is anarchy – an anarchy that pulverizes living 
entities to their atoms … its character appears of a nihilistic nature, since its offensive 
extends to the totality of relationships and no value is capable of resisting it.” And yet 
this demolition is but the necessary prelude to a recasting of being: “this anarchy is 
nothing else than the first necessary step that leads to a new hierarchy of values.” 73  
  
Jünger would shortly witness the rise of a new regime intent on unseating the existing 
liberal order and erecting a totalitarian state whose ambition was the production of a 
new man whose rule would last a thousand years. War would soon follow. Both 
would fail to live up to Jünger’s vision, who from the outset assumed the position of a 
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brooding spectator at a remove from the events unfolding before him. While he would 
always refuse to publicly disown or express regret for any of his previous writings, 
the post-war period would see him forsake the nationalist rhetoric and eulogizing of 
war that had characterized them and espouse a quietist and contemplative stance in 
anticipation of the closure of the age of nihilism that  he nevertheless continued to 
hope for.  
 
 
 
Over the Line? Waiting for Nihil 
 
 
Above all, one must find security in one’s own heart. Then the 
world will change.
74
 
 
 
Mobilized as captain of the Wehrmacht in 1939, Jünger’s experience of the Second 
World War contrasts markedly with that of the first. Stationed in occupied Paris 
throughout most of the conflict and assiduously frequenting the literary circles there, 
he was at a remove from the frontline and his war diaries display little of the 
enthusiasm that his younger self had felt, appearing at times almost indifferent to the 
drama playing itself out around him.
75
 A more somber tone nevertheless makes itself 
felt in the last years of the war as disaster for Germany loomed, news of atrocities in 
the East started to filter through, and Jünger’s eldest son was killed in Italy. 
Throughout the conflict, Jünger worked on an essay entitled The Peace that looked 
ahead to the end of the conflict and proposed a vision of a united federal Europe that 
some have seen as anticipating the European project that did eventually rise from the 
conflict’s ashes.76  
  
This appeased style is also evident in Over the Line which is the occasion for Jünger 
to return to the key themes that animated his past writings. Gone is the incendiary 
rhetoric and unrestrained celebration of war of the early 1930s but nihilism remains 
more than ever at the center of his preoccupations. Penning his words a few years 
after the war amidst the ratcheting of tensions between the two remaining 
superpowers left standing, Jünger has still not abandoned the hope of overcoming the 
nihilistic condition and purposely sounds an optimistic note. Insisting on the 
timeliness of Nietzsche’s writings, he reminds his readers that nihilism is not therein 
“considered as the end, but rather as a phase in a spiritual process that encompasses it, 
one which not only civilization in its historical unfolding but also the individual in his 
personal existence can overcome and leave behind, perhaps even growing over it a 
new skin, like a scar.”77 As it was after the First World War, the task at hand for 
Jünger is to salvage a sense of necessity and higher purpose from the debris of yet 
another global conflagration. 
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After the Holocaust, the firebombing of Dresden, and the atomic annihilation of 
Hiroshima, Jünger has seemingly lost his previous appetite for armed conflict, 
expressing the hope that if a Third World War is not implausible it is not inevitable 
either.
78
 Nevertheless, drawing on the image of the workshop as the site in which the 
present is being dismantled in preparation for the future, Jünger still endeavors to see 
a salutary necessity in the horrors of the latest bout of blood-letting: 
 
The landscape of workshops, as we know it, rests essentially on a leveling to the ground 
of the old forms in favor of the superior dynamics of the work process. The whole world 
of machines, transport, and war, with their destructions, belongs here. In terrifying 
images, such as the burning of cities, the leveling reaches its highest intensity. The pain 
is immense and yet, amidst the historical annihilation, the Gestalt of the age is realized. 
Its shadow falls on the ploughed-up earth, falls on the sacrificial ground. Then come the 
new plans.
79
 
 
Such an appreciation of the moment founds itself on an appropriate understanding of 
the phenomenon of nihilism that eschews common misconceptions that Jünger is keen 
to dismiss. Thus he insists that nihilism is not synonymous with chaos or sickliness 
which are in his eyes only secondary and non-necessary traits. Nihilism seems on the 
contrary to accord itself very well with order which in fact becomes all the more 
encompassing and machine-like the further the obstacle of traditional values is swept 
away. Hence why the vast apparatuses of production and destruction assembled in the 
modern world seem equally capable of serving under different, even explicitly 
antagonistic, banners (this of course equally applies to all the individuals required to 
operate and manage them since, after all, “the virtue of the functionary is to 
function”).80 Consequently, one can observe that: 
 
armies become all the more apt to nihilistic action the more the old law, that which is 
conceived as tradition, fades away. In the same proportion grows their purely ordering 
and instrumental character and therefore the possibility of making use of the armed 
forces for anyone whose hands are on the levers.
81
 
 
And in what is undoubtedly an allusion to the Holocaust, Jünger underlines that “even 
in the places in which nihilism displays its most sinister traits, such as the great sites 
of physical extermination [Vernichtungstätten], there is sobriety, hygiene and strict 
order to the last.” 82  Chaos is therefore only the outcome when one of the 
“constellations” in which nihilism has invested itself comes to fail, as the Third Reich 
indubitably just had.
83
 The “decisive question” then becomes “how much genuine 
anarchy, and thus still unordered fertility, is concealed in chaos.”84 
 
The essay is also notable for its attacks on the figure of the “Leviathan”, discussed 
with direct reference to Nietzsche’s description of the state as a “cold monster” and 
denoting an inimical stance towards state power that is at odds with the visions of 
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total social mobilization Jünger had previously endorsed.
85
 He goes so far as to assert 
that “one of the Leviathan’s moves is to delude the youth into believing that its call to 
arms is identical to that of the Fatherland. He reaps in this way his best victims.”86 
Jünger is rather elusive about the identity of the Leviathan he warns against in these 
brief passages but it seems to refer primarily to the state as nihilistic and 
instrumentalist entity since elsewhere Jünger writes of the coming “world state” in 
more positive terms.
87
 Perhaps we find here the sense of Jünger’s claim that the Nazis 
had offered only an “ametaphysical solution, the purely technical execution of total 
mobilization.”88 Also noteworthy is the positive connotation now given to security 
which had previously been scorned as the mark of bourgeois timorousness, even if the 
security considered here is first and foremost to be found in the “wilderness” and in 
one’s “own heart”.89 
 
Jünger ultimately offers little evidence to substantiate his claim that the line of 
nihilism is about to be crossed and the tone of piece is generally one of hope rather 
than expectation. In accordance with his previous writings, he continues to reason in 
terms of a process of nihilism that must reach its ultimate conclusion before it can be 
transcended. “The nihilistic world is in its essence a reduced world and being further 
reduced, corresponding to the necessary movement towards the zero point 
[Nullpunkt]”, the very point at which this reduction will be reversed.90  
 
If he was forced to later concede that his post-war optimism that we had already 
“passed the zero point”91 was premature, Jünger would maintain a sanguine outlook 
regarding its eventual occurrence for the rest of his life, although this increasingly 
appeared to be grounded more in a sense of cosmic necessity than in any trenchant 
interpretation of the historical conjuncture.
92
 In the meantime, he would adopt a 
quietist position above the fray of political struggle, a stance that would be first 
expressed in terms of the Waldgänger’s “flight into the forest”93 before becoming that 
of the “anarch” as an independent sovereign individual that eschews any direct 
confrontation with the present order in favor of a discreet existence within its 
interstices.
94
 Faced with a technologically dominated world that continued to be 
arrayed under the sign of the Worker but failed to deliver the expected spiritual 
elevation, Jünger effectively retreated into the quasi-mystical contemplation of an 
aesthete whom by his own admission was not so easy to differentiate from that of “the 
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solipsist, who thinks the world is his creation.”95 Over time, the prospect of the final 
overcoming of nihilism would recede ever further in the distance with Jünger evoking 
in the final years of his life the twenty-third century as the time of its arrival and more 
calamities to come before then.
96
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The history of inventions … raises ever more clearly the question of 
whether a space of absolute comfort or a space of absolute danger 
is the final aim concealed in technology.
97
 
 
 
Jünger’s philosophical outlook was profoundly and durably shaped by his encounter 
with Nietzsche’s writings. In particular, he found in the doctrine of the will to power 
what he took to be an account of the elemental force of becoming that he believed he 
had witnessed amidst the slaughter of the First World War. Through his military 
experience and subsequent reflections, Jünger devised keen insights into the historical 
escalation of war and the demands of total mobilization that it increasingly made upon 
society. Until at least the mid-1930s, he would unrestrainedly celebrate this 
development, seeing in it the birth pangs of a new order that would overcome the 
nihilist condition afflicting the modern world. Yet the forces of destruction unleashed 
eventually outpaced even his ardent bellicism, razing to the ground major cities and 
piling ever higher the bodies of soldiers and civilians alike. With the advent of nuclear 
weapons, it became self-evident that the annihilation of human life was a more likely 
outcome of another bout of total war than any new blossoming of being. Abandoning 
the voluntarism that had characterized his earlier work, the post-war Jünger would 
thereby tacitly concede that the strategy of excess he had advocated through his 
rapturous embrace of war and the domination of technique had been ruinous. He 
would thereafter find refuge in the promulgation of an individual form of anarchism 
able to pragmatically navigate the strictures of the spiritually impoverished times until 
the dawn of the new age he never ceased to hope for.
98
  
 
One possible conclusion that might be drawn from Jünger’s trajectory from fascistic 
élan to resigned quietism is that the theory of nihilism advanced by Nietzsche and 
which he had made his own was a deeply problematic conception that rested upon an 
all too broad cultural diagnosis and ended up sanctioning some of the most disastrous 
political experiments of the twentieth century. Certainly, one could find particular 
fault in the arguably perverse notion that an intensification of the processes of 
technical domination and its concomitant hollowing out of established values would 
necessarily, by a mechanism that remained as unspecified as numinous, result in their 
inversion and the founding of a new self-justifying sovereign being. For Jünger as for 
                                                 
95
 Quoted in Neaman, A Dubious Past, p. 237. Jünger published in 1970 a book of reflections on his 
various psychedelic experiences, including those he shared with the discoverer of LSD, Albert 
Hofmann. Ernst Jünger, Annäherungen: Drogen und Rausch (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1970) 
96
 102 Years in the Heart of Europe: A Portrait of Ernst Jünger (Director: Jesper Wachtmeister), 1998 
97
 Ernst Jünger, “On Danger”, p. 30 
98
 The elderly Jünger would acknowledge the debt owed to Max Stirner’s writings in his formulation of 
the figure of the ‘anarch.’ Hervier, Entretiens avec Ernst Jünger, pp. 100-101 
 21 
Heidegger, the cherished Hölderlinian credo that “where danger is, also grows the 
saving power” would ultimately be synonymous with little more than enduring faith 
in a form of transcendent intervention once the political programmes they had 
championed had been so completely discredited.
99
 
 
And yet Jünger’s work should remain of interest to us today as more than mere 
intellectual history or even a cautionary tale of the perils of a voluntarist strategy of 
excess. Indeed, if Jünger radically underestimated the resilience of liberalism while 
the totalitarian regimes he initially welcomed were swept away by the tide of history, 
his assessment of the centrality of technique to modern societies can be said to retain 
much of its analytical purchase even where it did not yield all the effects he had 
anticipated. 
 
For one, the perpetual mobilization of energies for the purpose of war that he 
identified persists to this day, except that the harnessing of the unimaginable power of 
the atom and the quasi-instantaneous means of its delivery no longer requires 
anything like the centrally planned war economies of the first half of the twentieth 
century. The fact nevertheless remains that, even with the end of the Cold War, the 
world remains on the very edge of a nuclear apocalypse that could be initiated at the 
press of a button. Simply, the development of our engines of destruction has been 
such that if total war remains an ever-present possibility it so far has been warded off 
by the seeming impossibility of reconciling it with either instrumental designs or the 
supposed ancestral nobilities of the warring spirit. The marshaling of military power 
of annihilatory proportions has consequently remained compatible with the kind of 
liberal bourgeois societies Jünger believed were destined to disappear but which 
instead came to outlast all their putative rivals. 
 
This is not to say that Jünger’s characterization of our age as one governed by the 
figure of the Worker has itself lost its salience. Indeed, it can be readily observed that 
the logic of production and rational optimization has only further extended itself into 
all facets of social life, seemingly submitting all previous belief systems to its 
imperatives without replacing them with any new values than those of individual 
comfort and security. The mass conscription of societies in view of the pursuit of all-
out offensive à l'outrance may no longer be the order of the day but we have 
nonetheless experienced a persistent blurring of the states of war and peace in 
accordance with the changing traits of mobilization and technique. The Cold War 
never attained the intensity of armed conflict experienced during the previous world 
wars but it was no less an all-encompassing struggle, in some ways anchoring the 
imperatives and logic of the technological war machine more deeply and durably than 
ever. Less a clash of ideologies that rung increasingly hollow, the conflict was first 
and foremost one of competing military-industrial-scientific complexes that endured 
until one of them reached a point of complete enervation. Nor did the end of Cold 
War entail true demobilization, the monolithic threat of superpower rivalry having 
given way to a proliferation of discourses of security that assert the need to 
continuously monitor and pre-empt all potential threats to productive life and 
authorize global projections of calculated violence wherever deemed necessary.  
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Ernst Jünger liked to refer to himself as a seismograph registering the underlying 
tectonic shifts that prefigured the tremors of his age and, personal vanity and 
retrospective self-justification aside, it is an image to which we can grant a certain 
acuity.
100
 Many of the views Jünger espoused, particularly in the inter-war years, have 
rightly elicited opprobrium. But they can also be read as a willful exacerbation of the 
tendencies manifest in his times, propelled by a quixotic mission to rescue a sense of 
agency and meaning from the cataclysm of the Great War and its aftermath. While 
ours may be different times, we nonetheless still wrestle today with the question of 
the place of the human in a world in which technology and war continue to play such 
a central role. So that, as much as Jünger erred in his historical prognoses and political 
commitments, his struggle with the problem of nihilism in the age of technique may 
very well still be our own. 
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